Our Bond, Inc. (OBAI) Company Overview

What does Our Bond do?

Our Bond, Inc. is a Nasdaq-listed personal-security technology and services company operating under ticker OBAI. Its central proposition is “preventative personal security”: a member uses the Bond mobile application to connect with trained Personal Security Agents working in 24/7 command centers, while the underlying software gathers location, communication and contextual signals to help detect unusual situations and coordinate a response. The company describes the platform in its 2025 Form 10-K as a cloud-based system combining automation, AI, human security expertise and links to third-party responders.

Who buys the service?

The economic focus is mainly business-to-business. Employers buy access for employees who travel, work alone, face elevated security concerns or simply value a professional safety resource. Bond also serves direct-to-consumer members and sells physical security offerings, including guarding, executive protection, threat assessment, monitoring and customized protection. The company therefore sits between software, remote security operations and labor-intensive physical services rather than fitting neatly into a pure SaaS category.

Why is the model unusual?

Traditional personal security is often reactive and expensive: a guard, patrol or emergency service is deployed after an incident or for a narrow high-risk assignment. Bond tries to move part of that value chain earlier, using a continuously available app and command-center layer that can guide, verify, deter and escalate. Its official website emphasizes the combination of technology, human operational execution and security expertise in its security platform description. The strategic question is whether this hybrid model can create software-like scale without being overwhelmed by service-delivery costs.

How does Our Bond make money?

Revenue comes from two broad economic streams. The first is recurring cloud-based SaaS revenue recognized over time. The second is services and other revenue recognized at a point in time, principally physical security and customized assignments. In the quarter ended March 31, 2026, SaaS contributed $363,000 and services contributed $1.984 million, for total revenue of $2.347 million. That mix makes the current business substantially service-led even though the strategic narrative centers on a scalable technology platform.

Which revenue source matters most today?

Physical service offerings dominate current revenue. That is important because guarding and executive-protection work can be operationally valuable but tends to carry direct personnel or outsourced-service costs. By contrast, recurring app subscriptions should have better incremental economics if customer adoption expands faster than command-center staffing and support costs. The latest filing explicitly states that most first-quarter revenue came from B2B customers and that the company wants platform utilization to improve as users are added.

What is the pricing and renewal logic?

Bond discloses recurring subscriptions, implementation or training fees and one-time services. Management calculates annual recurring revenue from actual trailing monthly recurring revenue rather than forward-looking contract values. The investor-relations site also highlights a 95% enterprise retention figure, indicating that renewal and license expansion are central to the commercial case. The most useful long-term test is not simply bookings; it is whether recurring revenue rises as a percentage of total revenue while customer retention remains high and gross profit expands.

What did the latest quarter show?

The quarter ended March 31, 2026 Form 10-Q shows modest top-line growth but severe expense pressure. Revenue rose 4.36% to $2.347 million, yet cost of services increased to $2.300 million, leaving only $47,000 of gross profit. Operating expenses jumped to $6.422 million, mainly because of direct-listing costs, a planned marketing campaign, investor-relations spending and higher public-company costs. Net loss widened to $6.703 million from $2.162 million a year earlier.

Why did expenses rise so sharply?

Management identified approximately $1.2 million of one-time listing expenses, $2.0 million of strategic television marketing intended for the second half of 2026, about $0.8 million of investor-relations expense and roughly $0.4 million of incremental public-company costs. Those items explain much of the year-over-year increase, but they do not remove the underlying issue: the current gross-profit pool is too small to absorb normal R&D, sales and administrative costs.

How financially strong is Our Bond?

Financial strength is currently the central constraint. At March 31, 2026, cash was $3.758 million and total current assets were $5.804 million, while current liabilities were $10.249 million. Total liabilities were $16.131 million against total assets of $5.893 million. This is not a self-funding balance sheet; continued operations and growth depend on outside financing, improved operating cash flow or both.

What does cash flow reveal?

Operating activities used $4.410 million in Q1 2026. Financing provided $7.607 million, including preferred-stock proceeds, a promissory note and warrant exercises. The cash balance therefore increased, but the increase was financing-driven rather than operating-driven. In valuation work, this distinction is fundamental: cash received from issuing securities extends runway but does not demonstrate economic profitability.

What does the annual baseline add?

For FY2025, revenue was $9.972 million, gross profit was $566,000, operating loss was $9.252 million and net loss was $10.549 million. Cash used in operations was $6.922 million. Compared with FY2024, revenue grew only 2.4%, while the net loss improved modestly from $11.017 million. The full-year filing therefore confirms that the weak first-quarter margin is not merely a listing-quarter anomaly; low gross profitability and reliance on financing were already structural features.

Which strategic turning points shaped the company?

Bond’s development is best understood as a sequence of technology building, early member deployment, pandemic retrenchment and public-market financing. The history matters because much of the company’s current valuation narrative assumes that years of platform investment can now be leveraged across a larger enterprise customer base.

1. 2017
   Doron Kempel founded the company and assembled engineering and product teams around a technology-enabled personal-security concept.
2. 2019
   The company had raised about $42M and built its technology platform and U.S. command-center capability.
3. 2020
   After a full year serving thousands of members, COVID-19 lockdowns caused the company to scale down and preserve core operations.
4. 2023–2025
   Bond expanded financing through preferred shares, crowdfunding and strategic capital while continuing product and service development.
5. 2025
   The company redomiciled to Nevada, reorganized its capital structure and prepared for a direct listing.
6. February 2026
   Trading began on Nasdaq and the corporate name changed from TG-17, Inc. to Our Bond, Inc.

What did the public listing change?

The listing created a public currency, broadened financing options and increased visibility, but it also introduced reporting, insurance, investor-relations and compliance costs. The company’s February 2026 name-change filing confirms that OBAI remained the trading symbol, while Nasdaq identifies the company as a listed issuer in its official OBAI listing page. For researchers, the key strategic consequence is that capital-market execution is now inseparable from operating execution.

What could become a competitive advantage?

Bond does not yet have a proven financial moat, but it has several assets that could become defensible if scale improves. The first is an integrated operating model: app, cloud infrastructure, command centers, trained agents, protocols and third-party response relationships. The second is accumulated operational data from member interactions and security workflows. The third is enterprise distribution, where a single employer relationship can add many end users and create renewal opportunities across geographies.

Where could switching costs arise?

Switching costs could come from employee onboarding, security protocols, corporate procurement, trust, service history and integration into travel or duty-of-care processes. Security buyers are sensitive to reliability and accountability; once a provider is embedded, a replacement must clear legal, operational and reputational hurdles. However, these switching costs are only valuable if service quality is consistently high and customers perceive the platform as materially better than simpler emergency apps, insurers, security consultancies or traditional guarding vendors.

Who are Our Bond’s competitors?

Competition is fragmented because Bond overlaps several markets. Traditional security companies provide guards, executive protection and monitoring. Travel-risk and duty-of-care providers sell corporate intelligence and response services. Personal-safety apps offer location sharing, emergency alerts or subscription-based dispatch. Employers may also rely on insurers, internal security teams, local vendors or public emergency services. This fragmentation is an opportunity because few rivals combine every layer, but it also means buyers can assemble substitutes from multiple providers.

What determines market position?

For Bond, market position will be decided by enterprise retention, member engagement, response reliability, recognized security outcomes and cost per protected user. A headline customer win matters less than repeat deployments and expanding licenses. The investor-relations site’s claims about Fortune 500 adoption and enterprise retention are strategically relevant, but the financial statements must eventually show that these relationships produce recurring revenue, stronger gross margin and lower customer concentration.

Who controls Our Bond stock?

Governance is founder-controlled. The FY2025 filing identifies Doron Kempel as chairman, chief executive officer and director. It also discloses 10,000 Series F preferred shares held by him, with each share carrying 40,000 votes. As of the filing’s beneficial-ownership table, Kempel held approximately 33.83% beneficial ownership of common stock on the stated basis and 95.76% of voting power. This creates a sharp separation between economic ownership and voting control.

How should investors interpret founder control?

Founder control can support long-horizon execution and protect the company from short-term pressure. It can also reduce minority shareholders’ influence over directors, compensation, financing and strategic transactions. The governance analysis therefore cannot stop at ownership percentages; researchers must monitor related-party financing, equity grants, preferred-stock terms and the board’s independent oversight. The company’s investor-relations portal provides board, committee and filing access.

What risks could change the story?

The most material risks are interconnected. Weak margins increase financing dependence; financing can create dilution; dilution matters more under concentrated control; and rapid growth can strain security quality, privacy safeguards and command-center operations. The 10-K also highlights customer concentration, cybersecurity, AI uncertainty, product defects, liability if a user is harmed, litigation and dependence on internet and telecommunications infrastructure.

Why is financing risk especially important?

In May 2026, the company amended an equity-line arrangement, reducing its maximum aggregate purchase price from $300 million to $50 million, and revised warrant terms. It also issued a $1 million note bearing 10% interest and maturing September 1, 2026, with a requirement to direct 25% of net proceeds from future securities offerings toward repayment. These terms, described in the May 4, 2026 Form 8-K, illustrate why capital structure is a core operating issue rather than a footnote.

Why does Our Bond matter for valuation?

A conventional DCF is difficult because current free cash flow is deeply negative, financing needs are material and the future revenue mix is uncertain. The valuation case rests on a transition: from a service-heavy company with very low gross margin to a platform with higher recurring revenue, better utilization and operating leverage. Analysts should model that transition explicitly rather than apply a mature SaaS multiple to current revenue.

Which KPIs should researchers monitor?

The most informative indicators are SaaS revenue, total bookings, annual recurring revenue, enterprise retention, active users, revenue per enterprise account, customer concentration, command-center cost per member, gross margin, operating cash burn and fully diluted share count. Because Bond reports one segment, these operating KPIs are needed to separate platform progress from the mix of physical security assignments.

What is the key takeaway from Our Bond analysis?

Our Bond is an early-stage public company attempting to create a new category between personal-safety software and professional security services. Its platform, command centers, enterprise customer relationships and founder’s security-and-technology background provide a credible strategic foundation. The company has also demonstrated that customers will pay for a hybrid model and that corporate buyers can renew and expand deployments.

The financial evidence, however, remains demanding. FY2025 revenue was $9.972 million, gross profit was only $566,000 and operating cash use was $6.922 million. In Q1 2026, revenue grew modestly to $2.347 million, gross margin fell to roughly 2.0%, net loss reached $6.703 million and operating cash burn was $4.410 million. Cash increased only because financing inflows exceeded operating outflows. Founder voting control is overwhelming, while preferred stock, warrants, debt and the equity line make dilution and capital structure central to the analysis.