Cheetah Net Supply Chain Service Inc. (CTNT) Company Overview

What does Cheetah Net Supply Chain Service do today?

Cheetah Net Supply Chain Service Inc. is a Nasdaq-listed micro-cap company whose operating identity has changed repeatedly in a short period. The company now describes itself as a logistics and warehousing services provider, with its headquarters in Irvine, California, near the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Its 2025 Form 10-K explains that the business historically supported parallel-import vehicles sourced in the United States for sale in China, then pivoted toward freight, warehousing, and general labor services.

The company is better understood as a transition platform than a mature logistics operator

The early-2026 operating base consisted mainly of TW & EW Services Inc. (TWEW), a California labor and logistics provider, plus freight-forwarder Edward Transit Express Group. Cheetah sold Edward on April 1, 2026, then acquired Hong Kong-based industrial-equipment trader Super International Trading Limited on May 27, 2026. The post-quarter portfolio therefore differs materially from the March 31 statements.

How does Cheetah Net make money?

The operating model is service-based rather than asset-heavy in the traditional freight-carrier sense. Cheetah earns fees from labor support, logistics coordination, warehousing-related work, and—until the Edward disposal—ocean freight forwarding. The company relies on relationships with ocean carriers, trucking companies, customs participants, customers, and independent labor rather than owning a broad transportation network. That keeps direct capital intensity modest, but it also means differentiation depends on service reliability, customer acquisition, and partner relationships.

Which operation generated FY2025 revenue?

Revenue growth did not translate into gross-profit growth

FY2025 revenue rose 182.7% to $1.29 million from $0.46 million in FY2024, largely because TWEW contributed for a full year rather than only a partial period. Cost of revenue increased to $1.12 million from $0.28 million. Gross profit consequently slipped 6.6% to $0.17 million, and the implied FY2025 gross margin was about 12.9%. This is the key economic issue: reported growth reflected acquisition timing and low-margin activity, not a demonstrated scalable profit engine.

Which turning points explain the current strategy?

Cheetah’s history is strategically important because each pivot changed the meaning of its reported financials. The company was not built through a long organic logistics expansion. It moved from vehicle trading to logistics by acquisition, then used equity financing to fund loans and a large investment deposit while entering industrial-equipment trading.

1. 2016
   The business was formed around sourcing vehicles in the United States for parallel import into China, creating cross-border trade relationships but also high policy and customer-concentration exposure.
2. August 2023
   Cheetah completed its Nasdaq initial public offering, giving it a public-equity currency that later became central to acquisitions and liquidity.
3. February–December 2024
   The company acquired Edward and TWEW, relocated to Irvine, and shifted management attention toward the Los Angeles–Long Beach logistics corridor.
4. March 2025
   The board discontinued the parallel-import vehicle business, separating the legacy model from continuing logistics operations.
5. February 2026
   A private placement issued 33.45 million pre-split Class A shares for $40.14 million of gross proceeds, transforming the balance sheet.
6. April 2026
   Cheetah disposed of Edward and completed a 1-for-200 reverse stock split; the operating perimeter and share count changed within the same month.
7. May–June 2026
   The company closed the $4.98 million Super acquisition, its CFO resigned, the CEO became interim CFO, and the CEO purchased 200,000 post-split Class B shares for $0.40 million.

The strategic pattern is acquisition-led reinvention

The April 2026 Edward disposition filing said the sale was intended to streamline operations, reduce adverse operating impact, and allow focus on new acquisition opportunities. The subsequent Super closing announcement confirms that M&A, rather than organic logistics scale alone, is now a primary route to changing the business mix.

What did Cheetah Net’s latest quarter show?

The Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2026 showed a very small operating business beside a newly enlarged financing balance sheet. Revenue fell 80.7% year over year to $92,700 from $479,799. Gross profit fell to $19,867 from $56,256, but gross margin improved to approximately 21.4% from 11.7% because cost of revenue declined faster than sales.

Revenue contraction was more important than the narrower loss

Why did gross margin improve?

The official first-quarter 2026 results release emphasized a $230,515 reduction in selling, general and administrative expenses. Cost control is useful, but the numbers show that a viable model still requires substantially more gross profit, not merely smaller corporate overhead.

Why are financing and asset deployment central to the story?

At March 31, 2026, Cheetah reported $50.99 million of assets, up from $11.86 million at December 31, 2025. The increase came primarily from equity financing, not earnings. In February 2026, the company closed a $40.14 million private placement. By quarter-end, $40.13 million was recorded as a deposit on a long-term investment, while cash was only $0.71 million and third-party loan receivables were $4.44 million.

The balance sheet is large relative to the operating business, but not conventionally liquid

Cash-flow movement reveals the capital-allocation sequence

Who competes with Cheetah Net, and where can it differentiate?

Cheetah’s filing does not identify named competitors, but it states that the company competes with local, regional, national, and international logistics providers on price, service quality, transportation speed, and breadth of offerings. Its practical field spans small Southern California forwarders and labor providers plus global networks such as DHL Global Forwarding, DSV, Kuehne+Nagel, and Expeditors. Those firms possess scale, technology, carrier buying power, and established trust that CTNT cannot currently match.

What could function as a narrow competitive advantage?

These are potential resources, not a proven moat. The 2025 risk discussion acknowledges that larger competitors may have longer histories, stronger brands, and greater financial, technical, and marketing resources. Customer convenience and reliability favor providers with proven reputations. For CTNT, the relevant competitive test is therefore repeat business, gross-profit growth, and service execution—not simply adding another subsidiary.

How should an MBA reader frame the market position?

What do ownership and governance signal?

CTNT has dual-class common stock. Each Class A share carries one vote, while each Class B share carries 15 votes and can convert one-for-one into Class A. This structure gives Class B holders disproportionate influence over corporate actions. In February 2026, Huan Liu and Fairview Eastern International Holdings approved reverse-split authority through written consent while holding approximately 79.16% of voting power at that date.

CEO control increased again in June 2026

On June 15, 2026, Huan Liu—chairman, CEO, and interim CFO—purchased 200,000 post-split Class B shares from the company at $2.00 per share for $400,000. The related amended Schedule 13D reported aggregate beneficial ownership of 203,456 shares on an as-converted basis, equal to 6.4% of the relevant class calculation. Because those holdings are Class B, the voting influence is much larger than the economic percentage suggests.

The May 2026 CFO resignation filing said the departure was not caused by disagreement, but the temporary concentration of financial and executive duties still deserves monitoring. For investors, governance analysis should focus on related-party transactions, acquisition approval, investment-deposit oversight, disclosure quality, and whether the board adds a permanent finance leader.

Which opportunities could change Cheetah Net’s scale?

The opportunity case depends on capital deployment and post-acquisition integration. Cheetah’s operating revenue is too small to support its public-company cost base, so incremental improvements in the legacy business are unlikely to be enough. A meaningful change would require Super or another acquisition to contribute substantial gross profit, working-capital discipline, and recurring customers.

Super creates a new trading platform, but the economics are not yet visible

Cheetah agreed to pay $4.98 million in cash for 100% of Super International Trading Limited and completed the transaction on May 27, 2026. The acquired company is described as primarily engaged in trading large-scale industrial equipment. That opens a broader addressable market than labor support alone, but it also introduces inventory, counterparty, currency, product-quality, and transaction-timing risks. Until consolidated results disclose Super’s revenue, gross margin, cash conversion, and customer concentration, its strategic value remains unproven.

Operational leverage is possible only after a revenue threshold is crossed

Q1 2026 operating expenses of $0.78 million imply a cost structure far above current gross profit. A larger acquisition could spread listing, audit, legal, and executive costs across more revenue, but low-margin trading could enlarge the top line while cash flow stays negative. The useful signal is gross profit minus recurring overhead.

What risks could break the transition?

The risk profile combines logistics exposure with high transaction, governance, and financing risk. Management’s Q1 2026 release said losses and negative cash flow raised going-concern doubt, while citing $7.1 million of working capital and $4.4 million of loan receivables as support. Reported assets may still be difficult to monetize quickly or safely.

The reverse split is a capital-markets signal, not an operating fix

The April 2026 reverse-split filing reduced 391.18 million pre-split Class A shares to about 1.96 million and 690,875 Class B shares to 3,455. Reverse splits can restore a manageable quoted share price, but they do not improve revenue, margins, or cash flow. Researchers should therefore compare all historical per-share figures on a split-adjusted basis and focus on absolute share issuance after the split.

Funding flexibility can become a recurring dilution risk

Cheetah entered an at-the-market sales agreement in March 2026 that contemplated up to $100 million of Class A sales, with $70 million covered by the initial prospectus supplement. The agreement was terminated on June 26, 2026, after substantial sales had already occurred. The termination filing limits that specific program, but the company still has a history of using equity as strategic capital. Any valuation must therefore model both enterprise progress and the future share count.

What is the key takeaway for valuation and monitoring?

A conventional DCF based on historical operating cash flow is not yet reliable for Cheetah Net. FY2025 continuing revenue was only $1.29 million, Q1 2026 revenue fell to $92,700, and Q1 operating cash use was $2.46 million. At the same time, the company raised more than $40 million, placed most of it into a long-term investment deposit, sold one subsidiary, acquired another, and changed the share count dramatically. The terminal value in a standard model would overwhelm the evidence available from current operations.

Which valuation drivers matter most?