BT Brands, Inc. (BTBD) Company Overview

US | Consumer Cyclical | Restaurants | NASDAQ

What does BT Brands do?

BT Brands, Inc. is a Nasdaq-listed micro-cap restaurant operator. As of March 29, 2026, it owned nine restaurants and held a 40.7% non-controlling interest in Bagger Dave’s Burger Tavern, an affiliate with five locations. Its direct portfolio combines six Burger Time quick-service restaurants in the north-central United States with three single-location concepts: Keegan’s Seafood Grille in Florida, Pie In The Sky Coffee and Bakery in Massachusetts, and Schnitzel Haus in Florida. The company’s 2025 Form 10-K.

Nasdaq: BTBD Restaurant operator Nine owned locations 40.7% BDVB interest Quick service to fine dining
9
Company-operated restaurants at March 29, 2026
6
Burger Time drive-thru locations at March 29, 2026
5
Bagger Dave’s affiliate locations at March 29, 2026
179
Employees, including 28 full-time and 151 part-time, at March 1, 2026

Which concepts define the portfolio?

Burger Time is the only multi-unit owned format. Keegan’s, Pie In The Sky, and Schnitzel Haus each add one distinct local market, while Bagger Dave’s contributes through equity-method accounting rather than consolidated sales.

Burger Time uses a limited menu, flame-broiled burgers, drive-thru layouts, and fresh-to-order preparation. The official Burger Time site provides the consumer-facing brand context, while the filings explain why the model matters financially: the design seeks high food output with relatively low labor requirements and quick customer throughput.

How does BT Brands make money, and which concept matters most?

BT Brands earns almost all consolidated revenue from food and beverage purchases at company-operated restaurants. There is no material franchise, subscription, or licensing stream. Traffic and average ticket drive sales; food, labor, occupancy, and other store costs determine restaurant-level EBITDA; corporate costs, depreciation, investments, interest, and affiliate results determine consolidated earnings.

Step 1
Customer traffic
Drive-thru, tourist, repeat, and online demand.
Step 2
Average ticket
Burger Time ticket was about $14.50 in Q1 2026.
Step 3
Restaurant sales
Revenue is recorded at purchase.
Step 4
Store-level margin
Store costs determine restaurant-level EBITDA.
Step 5
Consolidated result
Corporate costs, investments, debt, and affiliate results follow.

Why is Burger Time still the operating center of gravity?

Burger Time
6 of 9 owned units, March 29, 2026
The only multi-unit owned concept, with centralized monitoring and owned-property support.
Single-location concepts
3 of 9 owned units, March 29, 2026
Keegan’s, Pie In The Sky, and Schnitzel Haus diversify concept and geography.
Bagger Dave’s affiliate
40.7% ownership, March 29, 2026
Its results are recorded under the equity method.
Owned restaurant count by concept — March 29, 2026
Burger Time — 6 locations — 66.7%
Keegan’s — 1 location — 11.1%
Pie In The Sky — 1 location — 11.1%
Schnitzel Haus — 1 location — 11.1%
Burger Time traffic and unit execution dominate the owned portfolio.

BT Brands does not report separate revenue and profit for each owned concept, so researchers must infer mix from unit counts and specific disclosures. For example, Schnitzel Haus contributed approximately $1.5 million of fiscal 2025 sales, while the Minot Burger Time location generated about $281,000 before closing in July 2025.

What does BT Brands’ latest quarter show?

The latest filed operating period is the 13 weeks ended March 29, 2026. The Q1 2026 Form 10-Q shows a mixed picture: lower sales and weaker restaurant-level EBITDA, but lower food costs, lower corporate overhead, a narrower operating loss, and much worse reported net income because of securities-market losses.

$2.84M
Sales, 13 weeks ended March 29, 2026
$267.7K
Restaurant-level EBITDA, Q1 2026
9.4%
Restaurant-level EBITDA margin, Q1 2026
$(751.0K)
Net loss, Q1 2026

Which operating lines improved, and which weakened?

Metric Q1 2026 Q1 2025 Interpretation
Sales $2.844M $3.231M Down 12.0%; the closed Minot location contributed $121,000 in Q1 2025, while remaining Burger Time units also sold less.
Food and paper $963.8K; 33.9% $1.200M; 37.1% A 3.2-point improvement from menu changes and moderate inflation.
Labor $1.111M; 39.1% $1.218M; 37.7% Absolute labor cost fell, but the ratio rose because revenue declined faster.
G&A $348.9K; 12.3% $451.0K; 14.0% Corporate cost control partially offset weaker store sales.
Operating loss $(232.8K); (8.2%) $(292.2K); (9.0%) Operating loss narrowed despite lower sales.
Net loss $(751.0K); $(0.12)/share $(329.8K); $(0.05)/share Investment losses overwhelmed the operational improvement.
Q1 2026 restaurant sales economics
Labor — 39.1% of Q1 2026 sales
Food and paper — 33.9%
Occupancy — 10.7%
Other restaurant costs — 6.9%
Restaurant-level EBITDA — 9.4%
The store-level margin remains thin enough that modest traffic or wage changes can materially alter consolidated results.
9.4%
Restaurant-level EBITDA margin, Q1 2026. The green arc represents the portion of sales left after food, labor, occupancy, and other restaurant operating costs, but before corporate G&A, depreciation, interest, and investment results.

The key distinction is restaurant performance versus portfolio-accounting noise. Q1 2026 included a $435,615 unrealized loss and a $79,395 realized loss on marketable securities, compared with a $44,024 unrealized loss and a $95,038 realized gain in Q1 2025. Those swings do not describe customer demand, but they materially changed reported net income. A DCF analyst should therefore model restaurant cash generation separately from securities gains and losses.

Why did fiscal 2025 improve despite lower revenue?

Fiscal 2025 was a restructuring year rather than a growth year. Sales declined 7.5% to $13.49 million from $14.82 million in fiscal 2024, largely because the Village Bier Garten operation was closed and the Minot Burger Time unit shut in July 2025. Yet the company’s restaurant-level economics improved sharply. Closing weaker locations, improving food and labor ratios, lowering general and administrative expense, and reducing impairment pressure moved the core restaurant portfolio closer to sustainable profitability.

138%increase in restaurant-level EBITDA, from $723,828 in fiscal 2024 to $1.721 million in fiscal 2025.
Annual metric FY2025 FY2024 What changed
Sales $13.487M $14.823M Down 7.5% after closures and portfolio pruning.
Food and paper 33.3% of sales 37.8% Improved 4.5 percentage points.
Labor 37.9% of sales 41.3% Improved 3.4 points, a major driver of store-level recovery.
Restaurant-level EBITDA $1.721M; 12.4% $723.8K; 4.9% Margin expanded 7.5 points.
Operating loss $(364.6K) $(1.832M) Approximately 80% improvement.
Net loss $(687.8K); $(0.11)/share $(2.311M); $(0.37)/share Loss narrowed substantially, although investment and affiliate items remained important.

Which margin levers matter most?

Restaurant cost ratios — FY2025 versus FY2024
FY2025 labor37.9%
FY2024 labor41.3%
FY2025 food33.3%
FY2024 food37.8%
Each pair is scaled to its own prior-year ratio. Lower percentages in FY2025 show why EBITDA improved even though total sales declined.

Which strategic turning points shaped BT Brands?

The company’s history is a sequence of portfolio decisions: Burger Time supplied the base, the 2021 listing funded expansion, and 2024-2026 tested management’s ability to integrate, close, and redirect assets.

  1. 1987
    The first Burger Time opened in Fargo, North Dakota. The limited-menu, drive-thru model still defines the repeatable operating core.
  2. 2007
    The predecessor ownership group acquired Burger Time, establishing the management lineage that later became BT Brands.
  3. 2021
    BT Brands completed its initial public offering and began trading on Nasdaq, creating public-market access for acquisitions and strategic investment.
  4. 2022
    The company acquired Keegan’s and Pie In The Sky, bought Village Bier Garten assets, and purchased a large minority interest in Bagger Dave’s. The Bagger Dave’s acquisition filing shows how quickly the portfolio broadened.
  5. 2024
    BT Brands acquired Schnitzel Haus for approximately $943,000 and authorized a share-repurchase program, while weaker units and assets generated impairment pressure.
  6. 2025
    Village Bier Garten closed in January and the Minot Burger Time closed in July. Portfolio pruning helped restaurant-level EBITDA rise despite lower sales.
  7. 2025-2026
    The company agreed to merge with Aero Velocity and contemplated spinning off the restaurant assets, but terminated the agreement after the contractual deadline. The official May 7, 2026 termination announcement returned the strategic focus to restaurant profitability, cash flow, and other alternatives.

What did the failed Aero Velocity transaction reveal?

The transaction exposed tension between restaurant operations and outside-sector expansion. The Aero plan would have transformed the listed company toward unmanned aircraft and drone services while spinning restaurant assets to existing holders. Its termination avoided immediate execution risk from a cross-industry merger, yet it also left the company without the scale transformation that management had pursued.

Restaurant path
9 owned units
Focus on traffic, margins, property value, and cash generation.
Strategic-alternative path
No Aero agreement
No replacement transaction was disclosed after May 7, 2026.

What gives BT Brands a competitive position, and where is it weak?

BT Brands lacks national-chain scale. Its narrower resources are owned Burger Time real estate, established local concepts, centralized management, a cloud POS system, limited-menu efficiency, and public-company transaction access. None is an automatic barrier to entry.

High scale / broad brand
National quick-service chains compete with much larger advertising, purchasing, loyalty, and digital-delivery systems.
High local differentiation
Keegan’s, Pie In The Sky, and Schnitzel Haus have distinctive local identities but only one location each.
BT Brands position: local portfolio / modest scale
A small collection of regional formats with owned Burger Time property and centralized oversight, but limited purchasing and marketing scale.
Low differentiation / low scale
Independent restaurants without brand history or property support face the most fragile economics.
Conceptual positioning based on BT Brands’ official unit count, operating formats, and risk disclosures; the company does not publish formal market-share data.

Which resources are genuinely valuable?

Owned real estate
All Burger Time sites
Provides asset backing and control, not traffic growth.
Drive-thru design
Single and double lanes
Supports speed and labor efficiency.
Local brand tenure
Burger Time since 1987
Encourages regional repeat visits.
Cloud POS
Implemented in 2025
Tracks sales, labor, and customer counts.

How intense is competitive pressure?

Competition is intense across price, service, location, and food quality. It competes not only with national, regional, and local restaurants, but also with delivery-focused operators, supermarkets, prepared-meal providers, meal kits, and at-home dining alternatives. Larger rivals can outspend BT Brands on advertising, loyalty, digital ordering, procurement, and remodeling. BT Brands’ own marketing has historically represented a small share of revenue, and a meaningful portion of sales comes from drive-by traffic and repeat visits. That can be efficient, but it also makes location quality and local reputation unusually important.

How strong are BT Brands’ balance sheet and cash flow?

BT Brands entered 2026 with meaningful liquidity, but the balance sheet is not risk-free. At December 28, 2025, cash and marketable securities totaled $4.44 million and working capital was $4.68 million. At March 29, 2026, cash plus marketable securities had fallen to approximately $3.64 million and net working capital to about $3.9 million. Total debt remained close to $2.05 million, while operating lease obligations added another $1.52 million. Marketable securities fluctuate and should not be treated like stable restaurant cash flow.

Year-end liquidity
$4.44M
At December 28, 2025.
Quarter-end liquidity
$3.64M
At March 29, 2026.
Quarter-end debt
$2.05M
At March 29, 2026.
Balance-sheet item March 29, 2026 December 28, 2025 Read-through
Cash $1.015M $846.2K Cash rose, but securities were sold and declined in value.
Marketable securities $2.629M $3.596M Liquid, but exposed to fair-value volatility.
Total assets $9.979M $10.745M Asset base declined during Q1 2026.
Total liabilities $4.295M $4.327M Broadly stable quarter to quarter.
Shareholders’ equity $5.684M $6.418M Reduced mainly by the Q1 2026 net loss.
Operating lease obligations $1.521M $1.568M Fixed commitments pressure unit economics.

Is operating cash flow becoming durable?

Fiscal 2025 operating cash flow improved to $284,876 from negative $713,505 in fiscal 2024. After $172,925 of capex, approximate free cash flow was $111,951. Q1 2026 operating cash flow was negative $97,650; after $40,113 of capex, the quarter was approximately negative $137,763.

FY2025
$284.9K operating cash flow
Improved from negative $713.5K in FY2024.
Minus capex
$172.9K
Property and equipment purchases in FY2025.
Approximate FCF
$112.0K
Operating cash flow less capex; a thin positive cushion.
Debt service
$189.3K principal
FY2025 debt repayment exceeded the approximate free-cash-flow figure.

How does capital allocation affect the analysis?

Capital is spread across maintenance, acquisitions, debt, securities, affiliate funding, and strategic transactions. Fiscal 2025 included $4.85 million of securities purchases, $4.08 million of sales, and a $520,718 related-party impairment. The company also terminated its at-the-market equity agreement on May 14, 2026.

Who owns BT Brands stock, and how does governance affect strategy?

BT Brands had one common share class and 6,154,724 shares outstanding on March 27, 2026. Insiders and several large holders can influence corporate actions, although no disclosed holder controls a majority. Chief Executive Officer and Chairman Gary Copperud beneficially owned 19.12%; officers and directors as a group owned 21.71%; Jeff Zinnecker owned 9.34%; and Sally Copperud owned 6.82%.

Holder or group Shares Ownership Why it matters
Gary Copperud, CEO and Chairman 1,196,923 19.12% Largest insider stake; aligns and concentrates influence.
All officers and directors 1,383,423 21.71% A material voting block.
Jeff Zinnecker 574,634 9.34% A significant non-management holder.
Sally Copperud 420,000 6.82% Meaningful family voting interest.
Treasury shares 306,394 Not outstanding Repurchased shares reduce the outstanding count.

What governance signals deserve attention?

Insider economic alignmentHigh
Board independenceModerate
Disclosure depthLimited
Strategic stabilityEvolving

Three of the five directors were classified as independent under Nasdaq standards in the 2025 annual report. The audit committee included all three independent directors, and the board identified Allan Anderson as an audit committee financial expert. Governance nevertheless warrants close monitoring because the CEO also serves as chairman, senior executives hold roles at Bagger Dave’s, and related-party investments have generated impairment charges. The company’s corporate governance page provides its code and board-contact framework.

There is also a listing-process signal. In January 2026, Nasdaq notified BT Brands that it had not complied with the annual-meeting requirement for fiscal 2024. The related Form 8-K is important because micro-cap governance quality affects investor confidence, liquidity, and strategic flexibility even when the underlying restaurants continue operating.

What opportunities and risks could change BT Brands’ outlook?

The upside case rests on stabilizing Burger Time sales, preserving food-cost gains, improving single-location profitability, converting EBITDA into free cash flow, and using owned real estate and public-company status carefully.

Driver Current evidence Financial line affected What to monitor
Burger Time traffic recovery Q1 2026 average unit sales were about $179,000, $51,000 below Q1 2025. Sales, labor leverage, occupancy leverage Unit sales, traffic, and ticket.
Food-cost discipline Food and paper improved to 33.9% of Q1 2026 sales from 37.1% in Q1 2025. Restaurant-level EBITDA Inflation, menu mix, and customer response.
Seasonal concepts About 40% of Pie In The Sky’s fiscal 2025 sales occurred in the third quarter. Quarterly sales and working capital Tourist traffic and weather.
Marketable securities Q1 2026 included $435,615 unrealized and $79,395 realized losses. Net income, equity, liquidity Portfolio mix and realized cash.
Affiliate performance Bagger Dave’s generated Q1 2026 net income of $218,248 after a property gain, versus a $310,181 loss in Q1 2025. Equity-method income and receivables Underlying operations versus one-time asset-sale gains.
Strategic transactions The Aero Velocity merger was terminated May 7, 2026. Transaction costs, dilution, business mix Any replacement transaction or financing.

Which risks are most material?

The risks are interconnected: traffic is price-sensitive; food and labor can outpace menu pricing; single-location concepts face weather and lease concentration; cybersecurity depends heavily on third parties; disputes create legal cost; and securities volatility can move earnings independently of restaurant operations. Keegan’s six-week disruption after Hurricane Helene illustrates location risk.

Burger Time average unit sales
Q1 2026 was about $179,000 per unit. Recovery would improve labor and occupancy leverage.
Restaurant EBITDA margin
9.4% in Q1 2026 versus 9.7% in Q1 2025; watch whether margin stabilizes as sales recover.
Food and paper ratio
33.9% in Q1 2026; retaining the improvement is central to the turnaround.
Labor ratio
39.1% in Q1 2026; higher than 37.7% a year earlier because revenue fell faster than payroll.
Operating cash flow
Negative $97,650 in Q1 2026; seasonality should be tested against full-year conversion.
Cash plus securities
$3.64 million at March 29, 2026; assess both liquidity and portfolio volatility.
Legal and listing matters
Monitor the Aero dispute, Village Bier Garten lease litigation, and annual-meeting compliance.
Capital allocation
Track acquisitions, affiliate funding, debt repayment, property sales, and any new strategic transaction.

Why does BT Brands’ business model matter for valuation?

A simple revenue-growth DCF is inadequate. Value depends on restaurant cash economics, non-operating assets and investments, and capital allocation. Securities gains are not restaurant profit, while restaurant-level EBITDA must still fund corporate expense, capex, leases, debt, taxes, and transaction costs.

Revenue base
Model traffic, ticket, closures, seasonality, and acquisitions.
Store-level margin
Food and labor ratios drove FY2025 EBITDA.
Corporate cost absorption
FY2025 G&A was $1.464 million, nearly as large as restaurant-level EBITDA of $1.721 million.
Asset value
Cash, securities, real estate, debt, and leases need separate treatment.
Affiliate economics
Model Bagger Dave’s separately from consolidated operations.
Strategic optionality
Do not model a future transaction before definitive terms.

Which ratios best translate the operating story?

Metric Calculation Latest reading Valuation use
Sales growth Current-period sales divided by prior-period sales minus one (12.0%)
Q1 2026 versus Q1 2025
Separates traffic from margin recovery.
Restaurant EBITDA margin Restaurant-level EBITDA divided by sales 9.4%
Q1 2026
Store economics before corporate costs.
Operating margin Operating income or loss divided by sales (8.2%)
Q1 2026
Shows that store-level profit did not yet cover depreciation and G&A.
Approximate free cash flow Operating cash flow minus property and equipment purchases $112.0K
FY2025
Shows a modest pre-debt cash cushion.
Net liquidity Cash plus marketable securities minus debt About $1.60M
March 29, 2026
Asset support, subject to securities and lease risk.

The SEC’s BT Brands filings page should be the reference point for updating these inputs. At this scale, one closure, asset sale, investment loss, dispute, or acquisition can reshape a year.

What is the key takeaway from BT Brands analysis?

BT Brands is best viewed as an asset-backed restaurant portfolio undergoing an operational reset, not as a scaled restaurant growth platform. Fiscal 2025 showed that management can materially improve food, labor, restaurant-level EBITDA, and operating losses by closing weak units and tightening costs. Q1 2026 then demonstrated the remaining challenge: sales fell 12.0%, restaurant-level EBITDA slipped, and investment losses produced a much larger net loss even while the operating loss narrowed.

The strongest elements are the owned Burger Time real estate, decades-old local concepts, improved store-level margins, a liquidity position that exceeded debt at March 29, 2026, and meaningful insider ownership. The weaknesses are equally specific: limited scale, dependence on a handful of locations, weak recent Burger Time unit sales, substantial corporate costs relative to restaurant EBITDA, volatile marketable securities, affiliate and related-party complexity, lease and transaction disputes, and a strategic direction that remains open after the Aero Velocity merger termination.

Final analytical synthesis
For students and investors, the central BT Brands question is whether better store-level cost control can become durable consolidated free cash flow before traffic weakness, overhead, legal costs, or capital-allocation mistakes consume the benefit. The next evidence should come from Burger Time unit sales, food and labor ratios, restaurant EBITDA margin, operating cash flow after capex, changes in cash and securities, Bagger Dave’s underlying operations, and any new strategic transaction. Those measures—not headline securities gains or one-time asset sales—will determine whether the 2025 turnaround becomes an enduring operating improvement.

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